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where a person has made a subsequent affdavit, contradictory to
the protest in which he was a joint declarant, the Court will believe
the protest, and reject the affidavit. 1-London Law Magazine.
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STEVART & METTLER, -vs. SCUDDER.
1. A commission merchant in New York receiving a parcel of corn, with orders to
sell for cash, sold itto a person, at the time of sale, in good credit. Thev sale was
made on Monday, and the -price was called ?of on the succeeding Friday, but not
paid. On tlhe next Mon~day, it became .known that the purchaser had failed.
'The loss was held to fall on the commissiqn merchaut, notwithstanding ah attenipt
was made to set up a usage in New York, that where a sale is made for cash, the
purchaser has three or ot four days to pay the money;
2. A usage to control or interpret contracts, must be known, certain, uniform,
reasonable, and not contrary to law.
8. &Smble.-That such usage as was set, up in this case, was unreasonable and

illegal.

ELMER, T.-The plaintiffs, who ate commission merchants in the
City of New York, sold a parcel of corn for the defendant, and
advanced -the money. They sold for cash, without any special
instructions, at the usual-charge for commissions in such cases, of
one cent a bushel. The sale was made on Tuesday, the 2d of
April, the corn being the n on board the vessel in which the defendant, whose residence is in Princeton, New Jersey, had sent it
to New York, he being- himself in the city at the time, and
informed who was the purchaser. He left town the next day, and
on Thursday,. -4th of April, plaintif- sent to him by mail, the
measurer's bill, bearing date 2d, and an account of sales bearing
date the 4th. The account stated the sales to have been made on
the 2d, to D. D. Conover, for $742 72, and from this sum is deI Towan, 2 W. Rob. 266; Commerce, 8 W. Rob. 295.
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ducted the charges, amounting to $47 06, leaving a balance of
net proceeds amounting to $700 66, for which amount they sent
their check on one of the banks in New York, payable to the
order of the defendant, which was endorsed by him, and afterwards
paid. The money was then sent, as was stated by the plaintiffs'
clerk, at the special request of the defendant, who said he had use
for it, and wanted it by the 5th. No intimation was made to him
when he made the request before leaving town, or when the check
was sent, that the payment of the money was at his risk, or that
he might be called on in any contingency to refund it.
At the time of the sale-to Conover, it appears he was in good
credit. Plaintiffs' clerk called for the money on Friday, the 5th,
and again on Saturday, but he was not to be found, and on Monday
it became known that he had failed. No part of the money was
ever paid to plaintiffs. Sometime during the week succeeding
Conover's failure, plaintiffs apprized the defendant by letter, of the
fact that they had not received the money, and called upon him to
refund it. To this, defendant replied by a letter dated the 18th,
declining to do so, and thereupon this suit was brought to recover
back the money advanced.
It was alleged on the part of plaintiffs, that by the custom of
trade in New York, when a sale is made for cash, the purchaser has
three or four days in which to pay the money, and that upon such
sales, the commission merchant does not guarantee, the risk of payment remains upon the owner. The question was submitted to the
jury by the Judge, who tried the cause, whether such a custom was
established by the evidence, and they were instructed that if it
was, and the jury was satisfied that the plaintiffs had acted in
accordance with the common usage, and in the absenoe of specific
instructions had been guilty of no negligence in transacting the
business intrusted to them, they were entitled to recover. No
exception was taken to the charge of the Judge, but upon the
coming in of the postea, a rule was obtained to shew cause why
the verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the evidence, and
the question now is, wfiether for that reason there ought to be a
new trial.
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That the usage of trade may be given in evidence to interpret
the otherwise indeterminate intention of parties, and to ascertain the
nature and extent of their contracts, is will settled. But such a
usage to be available, must.be established, known, certain, uniform,
reasonable, and not contrary to law. (2 Greenl. Ev., § 251.)
In the case of Clark vs. Van .NVrto wiek, (1 Pick, 843,) the same
usage which was set up in this case, was establshpd and sanctioned
by the Court. The purchaser in that case, paid a part of the money,
and bbcame deranged the next day, and the Court thought that
under the circumstances, the seller was not bound to follow and
reclaim the goods, and decided that the loss. must fall on the owner.
In the case of Bliss vs. Arnold, (8 Vermont R. 252,-the Supreme
Court of Vermont held the same usage to be unreasonable and
illegal.
The evidence produced on the trial of the usage set up by the
plaintiffs in the case now before us, was certainly not very definite.
The clerk says "it is customary to render the bill, and then wait thr4
or four days; on cash sales, money is considered payable in three
or four days. It is the custom of commission merchants, to allow
four or five days before calling for the money." Mr. Nivins,
another witness, who had been in the business in New York forty
years and upwards, lays, "as far as my experience goes, cash sales
embrace from three to seven days, and such is the custom there.
Articles vary a little; wheat and corn average three or four days;
flour seven or eight; seven at the'least." On the part of the defendant, several witiesses who were examined, testified that they
had never heard of 'the usage, and thope who had generally agreed
in saying that they always understood that- the risk of the delay
was upon the commission fnerchant. It appeared that in two cases
where losses had happenedt by the failure of purchasers, there Lad
been a dispute about the usage, and the matter was compromised.
No instance was shown in which the loss had been borne wholly by
the owner.

In the case of the Schooner Reeside, (2 Summer, 567,) Justice
Story remarks with great force and pertinency, "I own myself no
friend to the almost indiscriminate habit of late .years, of setting
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up particular usages or customs, inalmost all kinds of business and
trades, to control, vary or annul the general liabilities of parties
under the common law, as well as under the commercial law. It
has long appeared to me that there is no small danger inadmitting
such loose and inconclusive usages and customs, often unknown to
particular parties, and always liable to great misunderstandings and
misinterpretations and abuses, to outweigh the well known and well
settled principles of law. And I rejoice to find that of late years,
the courts of law, both in England and in America, have been disposed
to narrow the limits of the operation of such usages and customs,
and to discountenance any further extension of them."
A case could hardly occur, it seems to me, better calculated to
show the propriety of these remarks, than the one before us. The
defendant, a corn dealer residing -in the country, sends his corn to
a commission'merchant in the great mart of trade, to be sold for
cash. This he has a right to suppose the safest of all operations,
and so that he finds a safe agent he thinks himself secure of his
money. A sale for cash is a sale for the money in hand; at least
such is the general meaning of the term. Upon such a sale the
owner is not bound to deliver the goods until the price is paid. If
the price cannot be ascertained until the goods are weighed or
measured, ordinarily no property passes unto the purchaser until
that is done; and the lien of the seller on the goods for the price
is extended so far as to entitle him, even after he has parted with
the possession, and whilst the goods are in transitu, to retake them
on the bankruptcy or insolvency of the purchaser, if the price be
unpaid.
That the owner of goods who confides them to a factor to be sold
for cash, must still look after and run the risk of the solvency of
the purchaser, for any length of time longer or shorter, seems in
opposition to the very idea of a sale for cash, the first principle of
such a sale being that the goods shall not become the property of
the purchaser until he pays the money. A usage. to control and
reverse this principle, to makeothat cash which is not cash, but credit, if such a usage can"be deemed reasonable and legal, ought to
be well established by a custom so universal at the place where it
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prevails, and so precise and definite, that the owner of the goods
must be presumed to be fully aware of it.
The plaintiff's witnesses state the usage in the case of sales of
corn to be, that the commission merchant is to wait three, four or
five days, before he asks the purchaser for the money. But
whether this is merely at the option of the seller, and whether the
purchaser has an absolute right to claim the delay, like the three
days grace allowed on a bill of exchange, they do not state. The
defendant's witnesses, who were aware of the usage, considered it
entirely optional with the seller,'and dependant upon his confidence
in the purchaser. Is the delay to be three, four or five days?
Evidently there is no precise time fixed. Again: is the usage
adopted merely for the convenience of the factor, and at his risk?
This is the vital question, and the evidence leaves it undecided. It
is plain from the conduct of the plaintiffs in this'case, and from all
the evidence, that no settled understanding on this point has ever
been come to by the commission houses themselves. In some cases
where a loss has happened, they have claimed to throw it on the
owner, but it is not shown that any owner has ever acknowledged
its justice. There is, then, no plain definite usage known to allfparties, and by which all parties ought to be bound.
In the case of Wood vs. Wood, 1 Car. & P., 59, where a usage
to send goods to be left for inspection a certain time before an
answer was given, was set up, and some of the witnesses- spoke of
three days, and others of a week, "and one of a month as the time,
the Judge declared that a usage to be binding must be uniform and
universal, and that so uncertain a usage was not binding. In the
case of Sewell *vs. Corp., 1 Car. & P., 892, it was held that a
usage of veterinary surgeons to charge for attendance, when there
was not much medicine required, was too uncertain. These 'were
nisi prius decisions, but they were in accordance with the settled
doctrines of the law, and such as ought to be adhered to.
On account of its inequality and its great liability to abuse, I
strongly incline to the opinion that the usage set up, if it was fully
established, ought to be held to be unreasonable, and therefore illegal.
But waiving that question as not necessary to be settled, I am
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clear in the opinion that the evidence in the cause before us shows
no such fixed, definite and universal usage as ought to be held binding on the defendant, and to throw upon him the loss arising from
the failure of Conover to pay for the corn he purchased from the
plaintiff, and that consequently the verdict was right, and ought
not to be disturbed. This makes it unnecessary to consider-whether
the sending of the check was, under the circumstances, a payment
and nbt a mere advanceb. I think the rule to show cause must be
discharged.
GREEN, C. J., and HAINEs, J., concurred.

Supreme Court of -Pennsyvan'aat l'ittburg,September, 1853.
SHARPLESS ET Al Vs THE MAYOR, &C., OF PHIA.DEL PHIA.'

The following dissenting opinion was delivered by
LEwIs, J.-This is an application by certain taxable inhabitants
of the city of Philadelphia, to restrain the corporate authorities of
the city from subscribing to the stock of two rail-road companies,
one of which is called "The Hempfield Rail Road Company," and
the other "The Philadelphia, Easton and Water Gap Rail Road
Company.." The company first mentioned, is authorized to construct a rail-road from Greensburg, in Westmoreland county, through
Washington county, in this State, and through Ohio county, in the
state of Virginia, to the city of Wheeling. Every part of this road
is more than three hundred miles from the city of Philadelphia.
The company last mentioned, is authorized to construct a rail-road
from a point north of Vine street, in the county of Philadelphia, to
the borough of Easton, or some other point in Northampton county,
with the right to extend it to any other point in Monroe or Pike
counties, and to connect with the "Delaware, Lehigh, Schuylkill
and Susquehanna Rail Road," the "Delaware and Cobb's Gap
Rail Road," and the "New York and Erie Rail Road," or any
other rail-roaq, which may have connected with it in Pennsylvania.
No part of this rail-road is located within the corporate limits of
IFor the Syllabus of this case, see ante, p. 7.
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the city of Philadelphia. The Legislature, so far as they have
power to do so, have authorized the city of Philadelphia to subscribe
to the capital stock of these rail-road companies; and the question
for decision, involves the constitutional power of the Legislature to
authorize these subscriptions, without the consent of a minority of
those whose persons and property will become liable to seizure, in
satisfaction of the debts to be contracted thereby.
The grave character of this question, and the magnitude of the
interests to be affected by its solution, secure for it the most careful
deliberation. The incalculable advantages of rail-road improvements, in facilitating the commerce, and thus developing the
resources and increasing the prosperity of the country, present
strong inducements to sustain these subscriptions, if a warrant c~n
be found for them in the constitution. The course of de6ision in
several of t4e most considerable states of the Union, and the immense sums. of money invested by innocent holders on the faith of
them, are circumstances well calculated to shake the firmest mind
in its progress to any conclusion which shall- invalidate contracts
thus made. On the other hand, we cannot fail to anticipatq the
ruinous load of debt which may be laid upon the inhabitants within
municipal corporations, without any adequate means of prevention
or payment.; the heavy and perpetual taxes which may be imposed
to meet the interest of these debts, stripping the rich of their
possessions, and the poor of their liberty; and thus reducing all
classes, the farmer, the-mechanic, thi merchant and the laborer,
and their widows knd children to beggary and want. These disasterous results, followed by-the disgraceful but inevitable catastrophe
of REPUDIATION, will be aggravated by the consideration that they
were not the common'burthens, imposed upon the whole peopl9 of
the commonwealth, by their representatives, for the common benefit;
but have been laid upon particular sections of the community, without the consent of the minority, for objects not exclusively beneficial
to them, and by a7 body which cannot be made to feel their power
as constituents, when th~us separatedfrom theirfellow citizens, and
singled out as objects of exclusive oppression. .By thus separating

them from the mass of their fellow citizens of the State, and putting
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their property and liberty under the power of.corporate authorities,
or even under that of a majority of the inhabitants of such districts
as the Legislature may choose to select, they are deprived of the
great security against oppression, which is always to be found in an
appeal to the common sympathies and common justice of the whole
people of the commonwealth. The sovereignty resides, in the
whole people of the state, and not in-the people of particulardistricts. The representatives, judges and other officers of the State,
are servants of the whole people of the State, and not of particular
districts, and they possess no more power than their masters have
thought proper to entrust to them in the instrument establishing
the government. The sovereignty is composed of the legislative,
executive" and judicial powers. These powers are not "assigned to
any one man, or to any single body of men, but are distributed
among three co-ordinate departments, so that each may operate as
a check against the. encroachments of the others. It was truly said
by Mr. Madison, in discussing before the people the principles of
our federal constitution, that "no political truth is of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened
patrons of liberty," than that "the legislative, executive and judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct." -" The accumulation df all powers, legislative, executive and judicial, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether heredi
tary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." Federalist No. 47. There is, therefore,
no foundation whatever for the doctrine that the Legislature of the
State possesses all the powers of sovereignty not expressly withheld
from them. This notion is occasionally asserted by men who are not
careful to distinguish between our FREE and LIMITED governments
DERIVED PROM THE PEOPLE, and established by written constitu-

tions, and those absolute despotisms of the old world, which have
their foundations in secret fraud or open force, with no limitations
of power except the arbitrary will of usurping tyrants. There is
no more reason for affirming the existence of despotic power in the
Legislature than there is for asserting that it exists in the other departments. But we know that "power is continually stealin.g from
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the m, ny to the few," and that "eternal vigilance is the price of
liberty;" and, in the constant struggles of our most enlightened
champions of freedom to confine the feddral authorities within their
assigned limits, and to preseve the rights of the States, they are
continually maintaining the fundamental truth that "all powers not
expressly granted to the federal government, or necessary to the
exercise of powers thus granted, are reserved to the States respecttively, or to the people." As between the States and the federal
government, we cannot too earnestly teach that the latter is a government of limited powers, and that it has no powers but those
granted by the States; while the States, as original sovereignties,
have all the powers which they have not thus granted away. In
this discussion public attention is generally withdrawn from the
rights of the people themselves, when in 'conflict with the. powers
claimed by their own State governments. But when the question
arises between the State governments and the freeman who created
tdem, the principle applies with equal force that the people, as the
original source of sovereignty, retain all the powers which they
have not entrusted by their constitutions, to their public servants.
A State Constitution is not a technical contract between different
parties. There is but one party to it, the people. They have
established it for their own benefit, and they may alter, reform or
abolish it at pleasure. It is their own voice, spoken for the promotion of their own happiness, and the preservation of their own
rights. It must, therefore, receive that construction which shall
best advance the object in vie*, and which shall -tend most to preserve the rights of the people. 7 W. & S. 127. The eminent
jurist who gave judicial currency to the doctrine that the Legislature possessed all the powers of sovereignty, not expressly withheld from them by the Cbnstitution, performed for his country the
service of proving its fallacy by following the principle to its legitimate conclusion. It was not expressly declared that the Legislature might be prevented from enforcing unconstitutional Acts,
therefore it was at one time thought by him, that the judiciary had
no power to pronounce such Acts void. Baken vs. 1aub. 12 S.&
R. 372. It was not expressly said, that the Legislature should not
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exercise jadicial power, therefore it was at one time held, that they
might reverse or open the judgments of the Courts, and grant new
trials at pleasure and without notice to the parties. .Braddee vs.
Brownfield, 2 W. & S. 271. It was only provided that private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation,
therefore it was at one time supposed by him, that the Legislature
might take private property for private use without any compensation whatever! Harvey -vs; Thomas, 10 W. 63. These alarming
doctrines were but the legitimate result of the principles which he
had adopted. But, it is a satisfaction, although a melancholy one,
to know that the great mind that yielded to them did so only because he thought the Judiciary "too weak to withstand the antagonism of the Legislature;" (Greenoughvs. Greenough'1st Jones,
495; and that upon better consideration, when age and experience
had ripened his judgment, and impressed his mind more deeply
with the power of truth to resist antagonism of every kind, he renounced the errors which arose from imaginary weakness. The integrity of judicial duty demands the acknowledgment here that
Constitutional Law was not the department of jurisprudence on
which this great luminary of the Bench shed his brightest and dearest rays. But whatever confidence may be reposed in his opinions
on this branch of the Law, it is acknowledged by those who knew
him best and loved him most, that the expiring blaze was brighter
and better than the dim light which had misled his earlier judgment.
In De Uhastellaux vs. 'airhild, 3 Harris, 18, he declared it "the
duty of the Court to temporise no longer, but to resist temperately,
though firmly, any invasion of its province, whether great or small."
And accordingly the supposed right of the Legislature to take private property for private use, without compensation, was utterly denied in Norman vs. Heist, 5 W. & S, 171. The authority of that
body to exercise judicial power and to grant new trials was also denied, 1 Jones, 494, 3 Harris, 18, 6 Harris, 112. And the Constitutional duty of the judiciary to protect the people from all encroachments on their rights, whether by the Legislature or by others, has
under these just and elightened views of liberty, been temperately
but firmly maintained, 5 W. & S, 171, 5 Barr, 145, 6 Barr, 86, 9
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Barr, 108, 4 Harris, 256. Abundant authority, derived from other
sources than our own judicial decisions, might be cited to maintain
the principles which have at last'been thus recognized and fully established; but this is unnecessary. They are so -interwoven with
the structure of our Government, and so identified with true liberty,
that they cannot be overthrown until our free Institutions are themselves destroyed.
It is true that the present Chief Justice introduced into the case
of the Commonwealth vs. Rartman, 6 Harris, 113, what I conceive
to be the erroneous doctrine of his predecessor in office, after the
latter had himself openly renounced it. As my dissent from that
doctrine has, through some omission, not been reported, I take
leave to record it now, and to add that my -ground for maintaining
the constitutionality of the common school system, the pointdecided
in that case, is to be found in the plain and positive command of the
Constitution that "the Legislature shall provide by law for their
establishment throughout the State." The case did not stand inneed of the principle of unlimited or despotic power in the Legislature, and its unnece~sry introduction, under the peculiar circumstances, only shows the difficulty of eradicating error after ithas
been promulgated under the sanction of an influential name.
In a monarchical government, where one branch of the Legisla,
tive deparient is invested also with the supreme appellate judicial
power, it may be well enough to talk of the omnipotence of Parliament, and of the powerless condition of the Judiciary to oppose
their usurpations.. Where the theory of the government is that
all power is derived from the King, and that the people are only
entitled to such rights as are graciously granted by his Majestywhere they must either demand a grant of their liberties, swords in
hand, as in the case of Magna Charta, from King John, or sue for
them in the more humble form of a petition, as in the case of the
petition of right, reluctantly granted by Charles the 1st., it may
be appropriate to the subjugated condition of the people to admit
that they have no rights except those which are thus secured by
grant, reservati.on or acknowledgment. But the power and theory
of that government, so far as they'affected us, were alike overthrown
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by our Revolution. The principles openly asserted in the Declaration of Independence, and firmly established by that successful struggle, were directly the opposite of what prevailed before. Itwas there
proclaimed that all men are created equal; that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these
rights are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men; deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed. The colonies
were parties to this declaration of rights, 4 Kent, 12; but the same
principles were also set forth in the "Declaration of Rights" embodied in the Constitution of Pennsylvania. It was there declared
that "1all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments
are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety
and happiness; that they have certain inherent and indefeasible
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life, and
liberty of acquiring,possessing and protecting property and repu-

tation, and of pursuing their own happiness." This declaration
was inserted in the 9th article; and it was further declared, at the
close of that article, that every thing in it "is excepted out of the
generaltpowers of government, and shalforever remain inviolate."

Our ancesters had profited by the lessons of history, and by their
own experience of the testimony of "brief authority" to transcend
its limits by construction, and they thus plainly excepted out of the
general powers of government, unalienable rights of liberty and

property. .This declaration of rights was inserted in the Constitution expressly in order that "the great and essential principles of
liberty and free government might be recognized and unalterably
established." This is, therefore, an authoritative construction of
the limitation which they prescribed to the legislative power when
they clothed each branch of it, not with despotic power, but only
with the "powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a
free State."-This clause is not exclusively confined, if at all applicable, to the powers necessary for the preservation of order and for
regulating the manner of proceeding. These arc provided for in
other parts of the Constitution. On the contrary the clause in question has a direct application to the legislativepowers, and those can-

92

SHARPLESS vs. THE MAYOR, &o., OF PHILADELPHIA.

not be exercised jointly by bot4 branches as one body, but must always be exercised separately by each House, acting independently
of the other. The clause, therefore was necessarily and properly
expressed in the distributive form defining the powers of "each
branch." Each was established with members holding for different
terms, and required to possess-different qualifications from the other;
They sat in different Halls, under organizations and with officers
entirely different -rom each other. The clause, therefore, can have
no application to their legislative powers as a joint assembly, for, as
such, they had no such power whatever to which it could apply.
Keeping in view,' then, that the Legislature are empowered- to enact only sucl laws as are necessary for a nation of freemen, and
that the rights of liberty and property are particularly enumerated
as a portion of that freedom which is never- to, be violated, let us
proceed to inquire into their authority to conivert the property
which happins to be located within the territorial limits of. municiial *corporationsinto the capital stock of rail-road companies without the consent of its. owners.
"The right which belongs to the Society, or Sovereign, of disposing in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the
wealth contained in the State, is called the eminent domain. This
right is, in certain cases, necessary to him-who governs, and consequently is d part of the Sovereign power. But when he disposes of
the property of a community, or an individual, justice requires that
the owner be compensated out of the. public money. If the treasury is not able to pay it, all the citizens are obliged to contribute
to it, for the expenses of the State ought to be'supported equally,
or in a justproportion." Vat. 104 B. 1 ch. 20 s. 244. This prin-.
ciple of the public law was modified and restricted in our Constitution, by the declaration that no man's property "shall be taken or
appl'ed to public use, without the consent of his representatives,
and without just compensation being made." Const, Pa. art. 9, s.
10. But the Acts authorizing the municipal authorities to make
these subscriptions, have neither the form nor the substance of the
exercise of the Constitutional power to take property for public use.
Property is not here taken, or authorized to be taken for public use,
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but the right is claimed to make a contract, binding the inhabitants
for the payment of money without their consent. The attempt is
to appropriate their money to the purchase of rail-road stock, and
to convert their local municipal governments, pro tanto, into private corporations, located beyond their jurisdictions. There is no
offer or purpose to offer any compensation except the stock, and
supposed advantages of the rail-roads proposed to be made. There
is no provision or purpose to provide for the assessment of the compensation, or for any measure by which the just amount shall be ascertained. No State can make anything but gold and silver a legal tender. The compensation when property is taken for public
use, must be in money, and cannot be made in rail-road stock, in
land, or in any other article of property. Vranhorn's"Lessee vs.
.Dorrance,2 Dall. 386. These subscriptions are therefore not to be
sustained under what is called the eminent domain.
It has been urged that they may be sustained under the taxing
power. But these statutes do not necessarily and absolutely authorize taxation, although the subscriptions proposed to be made,
may, in certain contingencies, lead to that result. A tax differs
from the seizure of private property for public use under the Constitutional provision for a just compensation, in this, that the first
is a demand from each inhabitant of his just share of the expenses
of the government; the other is the seizure of his property, in addition to and without any regard to his proportion of the public
burdens. The duties of sovereign and subject are reciprocal, and
any one who is protected by a government, in his person or property, may be compelled to pay for that protection. It is a debt
founded upon the contract of government, which may be as justly
levied as any other debt. But this Court has declared it to be ' ' a
rule of the public law founded upon principles of justice which no
government can disregard without violating the rights of its citizens, that taxes shall be assessed "in such manner that all the citizens may pay their quotain proportion to their abilities, and the advantages they. derivefrom the society."
Commonwealth vs. Hood's
Executors, Eastern District, May 1853. This principle is sanctioned by writers of eminence in Europe and in this country;
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Vattel B. ch. 20, s.240, 2 Kent, 331. The Legislature cannot
authorize particular districts to be charged with more than their
just proportion of the public taxes. If they may authorize a city
or county to be exclusively taxed for a purpose, not local in its nature, they may authorize such a tax, to be imposed exclusively on
a single ward or township, or on a certain class of the inhabitants,
or on a certain number of obnoxious individuals, or even on a single person by name!! .If this doctrine be sustained, the political
party who may be in the minority might be charged with the whole
of the public burthens.
Thus the liberty and property of the citizen may .be swept away
from him in violation of the clearest principles of equal justice.
The existence of such a power in the government is utterly at variance with the objects for which it was instituted.- Instead of securing the rights of the citizens, it puts them in greater peril than
that which surrounded them in a state of nature.- It is idle to talk
of liberty and the right to "acquire, enjoy and protect" our property, while we acknowledge the existence of a despotic power
which may roll over us like the car of Juggernaut, and crush all
these rights in the dust at the pleasure of those who guide it. It has been thought. that the Legislature possesses-the power to
impose these burt~hens, by virtue of the generalgrant of " legi lative
power." But the granting, or enlarging of a corporate franchise
is not the enacting a law. A franchise is a privilege; a law is an
obligation. One is optional, the -other imperative. The creation
or alteration of corpbrations is therefore not properly a branch of
the "legislative power." Corporations were originally unknown
to the common law,-the honor of inventing them belongs to the
Romans. And the ppwer to create them, in England, belongs to
the King alone, by virtue-of his royalprerogative,and is not vested
in Parliament, under its legislative power. So completely is this
power vested in the King, that he may authorize a subject to create
corporations, 1 Black Com. 474; and the Parliament, when it interferes, does so, not by virtue of its legislative power, but under
its "transcending authority to do any act whatsoever." 1 Black
Com. 474. In this Commonwealth,, from the eatliest period, the
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power to create corporations has been exercised, under statutory
regulations, by every department of the government :-sometimes by
the Attorney General and GovernSbr, (Act of 16th June, 1836;)
sometimes by the Attorney General and Supreme Court, (Acts of
6th April, 1791, and 8th April, 1.833;) sometimes by the Courts of
Common Pleas, (Act of 13th October, 1840;) sometimes by the
Courts of Quarter S(ssions, with the. concurrence of the Grand Juries, (Acts of 1st April, 1834, and 4th April, 1843 ;) and sometimes
by the latter Court alone, (Act of 16th April, 1840.) If this power
was strictly a branch of the law making power, the Legislature
would not thus transfer it to the other departments, nor could the
latter receive such transfer. But as it is simply a part of the prerogative of sovereignty which, in England, belongs to the King,
and which, in this Commonwealth, was not susceptible of classification under either the legislittive, executive, orjudicialpowers, it has

thus, from the first establishment of the legislation, been exercised
by them all. It follows that the grant of legislative power confers no authority to create or enlarge the powers of corporations;
much less to perpetrate the proposed wrong upon the inhabitants
or property holders, within the limits of municipal corporations.
The power of the Legislature to create cities, boroughs, counties and townships, for the purposes of local governmet, is not denied. It has been found so convenient and necessary, and has been
so long established by usage and acquiescence, that we recognize it
as part of our system of government.-But the municipal powers
thus created must be confined to local and governmental objects.

There has been no usage or custom under which the people of particular ..districts can be embarked in extra territorial adventures

against their will. It is not intended to assume the absurd position that a municipal corporation can do no valid act beyond its
territorial limits. It has the right to accomplish all its local municipal objects, and this right carries with it as an incident to the
principalpower, the authority to use all the means necessary to
produce the desired result.-If a supervisor of the township high-

ways can not obtain within his township tools or laborers to open
or repair the roads, he may obtain them elsewhere beyond the
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township limits. If the Commissioners of a County, in the erection of a county bridge or a county building, cannot obtain suitable materials, or architects, or laborers, within the county, the
right to obtain them beyond its limits is a necessary incident to the
principal power. The paving and lighting of the streets of a large
city, and supplying it with wholesome water, are necessary to the
comfort, safety, health, and even the existence of its -inhabitants.
If suitable paving materials cannot elsewhere be obtained, it may
send to Quincy-for granite-if material for the manufacture of gas
cannot be had within its limits, it may send to Liverpool, Richmond
or Pittsburgh, for coal for the purpose. If the wells and springs of
water within the city are insufficient in quantity or quality, it may
bring water from the Croton, the Schuylkill, or elsewhere, and may
construct works for the purpose at any necessary point, either within or beyond-its territorial limits.-The test of its power is the object to be atiained. If that be lawful, and within its municeiat dutes and powers, the means follow it as necessarily as the shadow
does the substance. But in the case of these subscriptions to railroad stocks the theatre of action is not only extra territoriel, but
the object sought to be attained is itself beyond the range of nunicipal powers and duties. It is no part of the duties of municipal
corporations such as the cities, boroughs, counties ahd townships
of this Commonwealth, to construct distant rail-roadsafor iAepur
pose of drawing tie commerce and travel of the world within their
limits. If they may do this it is"impossible to, assign any limits
to their powers. They may establish lines of steamers across the
Atlantic and'Pacific Oceans, and commercial pgencies and extensive mercantile houses throughout the world: they may build ho-.
tels within and beyond- their limits, the latter to direct the travel
to points within their borders, and the former, to accommdate it
when it comes there. The manufacturing interests are equally
within the range of municipal powers, because they are necessarily
connected with commercial prosperity. These authorities may therefore, on the same principle, erect extensive manufacturing estabmeats. They may thus take control of every branch of industry.
Like Aaron's rod, municipal enterprise may swallow up all private
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enterprises. It may thus extinguish separate and individual rights
of property, and bring everything into common. What is this but
a Fourierestablish~ment upon a magnificent scale? The system of
the Socialists may have its advantages, but no man can constitutionality be compelled to embark in it. The State, as an incident
of her independent existence, has a right to improve her condition
at the common expense of her people; but she has no more right
to abandon the liberty'and prosperity of any portion of her citizens
to the will of others than she would have to transfer them to a
Russian or an Austrian Despot. She has no more right to thus
compel particular classes to build rail-roads than she has to coerce
them into the erection of stores, hotels and manufacturing establishments. She has no more right thus to bring ev'rything into
common stock than he has to establish the Institution'of marriage,
and to extinguish the existence of separate families.
The principle is the same whether the Rail-roads to be constructed are located a thousand miles off, or terminate at, or pass through
the municipal territory. In neither case can the municipal corporation embark in the enterprise by placing its revenues under the
control of private corporations. These principles were sanctioned
by this Court in 1889, as I understand the case of .M.'Dermondvs.
Kennedy: The borough of INewville under a charter which fully
authorized the town council to enact such ordinances as shall be determined by a majority of them necessary to promote the benefit
and advantage of the borough, determined that it would be td the
benefit and advantage of the borough to pay to the Cumberland
Valley Rail-road Company 8 1.000 to change the location of their
road so as to bring it near the town that it might derive "advantage from the trade and travel which the road would bring." The
cause was put by agreement, on the question whether the borough
had the legal power to make subscription, and to assess and collect
taxes for its payment. The learned and experienced President
Reed, decided in the Court below, that "it was not a borough purpose-that the advantages of the rail-road were private rights, not
corporate municipal rights-and that if the right claimed "by
the town (ouncil be maintained, then the inhabitants of Newville
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have given over the inalienable right of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property." The judgment was rendered against the power claimed by the corporation, and that judgment was affirmed by

the Supreme Court. Brightly's Rep. 332. Let it be remembered
that the charter gave the town council full power to do any thing
which a majority of them thought for the benefit and advantage of
the borough-that the majority were expressly constituted the judges of what was fok its "benefit and advantage"-and that the change
of location of the rail-road was determined to be a "benefit and
advantage to the borough. "That it was beneficial and advantageous was not denied, and could not be doubted. But the objection
to the exercise of the power was that the object sought to be obtained was not properly a Borough purpose-and that the exercise of the taxing power by the town council for such a lUrpose,
was unconstitutional, because it invaded the rights of the citizens
to "acquire, enjoy and protect their property." Under the extensive powers conferred by the charter I can perceive no other
ground upon which the decision could have, been placed, without
restricting the express words of the law: and, as the reasons giien
by the Judge below were perfectly unanswerable,, and were not answered or attempted to be answered, or disapproved of by the Supreme Court, the inference is that they were adopted. It is not
probable that a heresy,, on such an important constitutional- point,
would have been suffered to pass without correction. The decision
of this Court, in that 'ease, is therefore, in my opinion, a 'dircet
adjudication on the question now before us. It covers -all the
ground necessarily taken in the case under consideration. Has it
been overruled? And if so, upon -what grounds?
It stood for undoubted law for 'ten years. But in May, 1849,
the case of Commonwealth, vs. Ac' Williams came up for decision.
It was a quo warranto in which the Supervisors were charged with
exercising the taxing power under the act of 13th of April, 1846,
for the use of the Spruce Creek and Water street turnpike road
company." This allegation was denied by the plea, and the cause
went to the jury on that issue of fact! The plaintiff failed to
establish her allegation by evideice. The Court -below thereupon
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told the jury that "the evidence failed to support the information,
au' that therefore, the verdict must be for the defendant." On a
writ of error the Supreme Court, in like manner, decided that "all
the evidence in the cause proves conclusively that the taxes complained of were not levied under the act of assembly pleaded, but
by virtue of authority vested in Supervisors of townships by virtue
of the Act of 15th of April, 1884, consequently, upon the very
point presented by thejpleadings, the verdict and judgment could
not be otherwise than for the defendant." This decided the cause;
and there the learned Judge might, with great propriety, have stopped. With the most perfect respect for him, and for those who differ from me in this matter, I cannot but believe the judicial duty
is always best performed when the judge carefully av6ids prejudging questions, which do not properly arise. This is a duty of high
and special obligation when those questions affect the constitutional rights of the people, for whose benefit the government was established. The record presented no question for decision in regard to
the power of the Supervisors to subscribe for shares of the capital
stock of a turnpike company, at the cost of the inhabitants of the
township. In volunteering an opinion upon that question, at the
desire of the parties, the learned judge exhibited a good natured
dispositiori to gratify them with his council, but he was not in the
line of his official duty, and it is therefore not to be presumed that
he poke under instructions from his judicial brethern, or that he
delivered their opinions. The authorities cited in support of his
opinion, are Commonwealth vs. .ie'(Tlos y, et al. 2 Rawle, 874:
Harvey vs. Thomas, 10 Watts, 68; and 2J1'' Clenagan vs. Curwin,
' Yates, 862. The first (Commonwealth vs. Mfc'Olosky) is cited to
where the prohibition is not found in the primordial
prove that "w
of a power cannot be deemed unconstutional
"the
exertion
part,
even though it seems to trespass upon our ideas of natural justice
anl right reason." But no such doctrine is to be found in the case.
On the contrary, the validity of an Act of Assembly against the
p-inciplcs of ifatural justice, is not there put upon the ground that
tliere is "no prohibition of it" in the Constitution. Far from it.
lti validity is there expressly stated to depend upon the question
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whether it was "within the general scope of their Constitutional
power." And the doctrine that the Federal or State Legislature
possesses all the powers from which they are not expressly restrained, was in that very case, declared to be "a political heresy altogether inadmissible in a republican government." (Rawle, 373.)
The second case (Harvey vs. Thomas,) was one in which the lateral rail-road law was held to be constitutional upon the plain and
undoubted principles that "the end to be attained by it is the public prosperity-that Pennsylvania has an incalculable interest
in her coal mines, that. the incorporation of rail-road 'companies is
a measure of public utility, that the privilege given to an artificial
person is as constitutional as when given to a naturalperson." But
the case was cited for the position unnecessarily taken by the late
Chief Justice, that "the Legislature might appropriate private property to the use of a private way without making compensation,
8inCe the constitutional inhibition relates solely to public uses."
The notion of unlimited and despotic power in the Legislature to
take one man's property and give it to another, for no public purpose, without compensation, never had any footing in Pennsylvania, or in any other State where the people are free. It is denied
in 5 Paige, Ch. R, 159, 11 Wend, 149, Saxton's Ch. R. 695, 2 Peters, 657, 18 Wend, 59, 4 Hill, 144, and 8 Dall. 587. It was also
denied in Laken vs. Rlaub, 12 S. and R. 272, in Vanhorn's Lessee vs. .Drrance,'2Dall. 886, in Commonwealth vs. Xc' Joskey, 2
Rawle, 873; in Norris vs. Clymer, 2-Barr. 279, in Pittsburgh vs.
cott, 1 Barr, 811i in Lamberton vs. Began, 2Barr, 24, and in Norman vs. Reist, 5 W. & S.. 174. In Norris vs. Clymer, and Norman vs. Heist, it was most distinctly and unequivocally recanted by.
the late Chief Justice- Gibson himself. In the case last named he
says that "it was not deemed necessary to disable the Legislature
specially in regard to taking the property of an individual, with or
without compensation, in order to give it another, not only because
the general provision in the Bill of Rights was sufficiently explicit
for that, but because it was expeCted that no Legislature would be
so regardless of right as to attempt it." As the opinion of Mr.
Justice Bell in-the Commonwedlth vs. ATh Williams, is founded
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principally upon the supposed existence of absolute power in the
'Legislature, as stated by the late Chief Justice Gibson in. Harvej
vs. 1knt.
s, it is to be regretted that he omitted to notice the cases
in which that power was denied, and particularly the two in which
it had been distinctly repudiated as an error by the distinguished jurist who gave it currency. It is also of some importance, in
*connexion with this question, to bear in mind that the learned
Judge who delivered the opinion in the Commonwealth vs. Xc Williams, seems to have overlooked his own views of the "definite and
limited rowers of the Legislature," as expressed but two years before in Parkervs. Commonwealth, 6 Barr, 513. It may likewise
be remarked that he does not seem to have been apprised of the
then unreporteddecision of this Court in Me Dermond vs. Kennedy,
in which, according to my understanding of the decision, it was
held that the exercise of the power claimed in the case before us
was a violation of the right of property expressly reserved from
the general powers of government. The last case cited by the
learned Judge (M'Cleneghan vs. Curwin) was a case in which it
was held that the Act to incorporate a turnpike company was constitutional, and that, under the original compact with the landholders, in which they received 6 acres in every 100, without compensation, in trust for the purpose of making roads, the land might be
taken for the purposes of the turnpike road without paying for any
thing but the improvements made by the occupant. It is difficult
to understand why this power should have been doubted or denied,
or what it has to do with the question under consideration. The
land taken for the road did not in equity belong to the patenteesthey held it expressly in trust for the purposes for which it was appropriated. No man was compelled to travel over the turnpike
road nor was any man compelled to subscribe to the stock, or to pay
taxes for its construction. Those who did not think proper to travel over it were at liberty to wade in the mud or jolt over the stones
of their ordinary roads as before; but if they desired to, mak;e use
of the labors of others it was just that they should pay a reasonable toll as a compensation. It seems to follow that-the opinion in
I ommonz.,ealth vs. life Williams, so fir as it purports to be found-

102

SHARPLESS Ts. THE MAYOR, &c., OF PHILADELPHIA.

ed upon the decisions cited to support it, is utterly unsustained by
authority. So far as it stands upon the principle that the Legislature may exercise all powers from which they are not expressly excluded by the Constitution, its foundation is equally frail. No jurist, after proper reflection, ever thought it neccessary for a free people to write it down in their Constitution that their Legislature
should allow them to purchase land and to farm it, to employ themselves in trades and professions, to embark in the manufacturing or
mercantile pursuits; to make contracts in regard to the business of
life, to travel or remain at home as business or pleasure shall prompt,
or to engage in any pursuit whatever, provided it neither injured
others nor endangered the public morals. There is no special provision to secure these rights from legislative invasion. But, as they
are the rights of freemen, which have never been surrendered, the
Legislature that shouldattempt to violate them: would be scourged
into retirenent by the unanimous voice of their indignant masters,
while their unconstitutional enactments Would be declared inoperative for want of authority, by every Judge who understood the
true foundations of law and free government.
The stateliness of a building may delight the eye, but stability
depends upon its foundations, which are concealed in the bosom of
the earth. Passing by the attractions which surround the opinion
in Commonwealth vs. Ac William, I have carefully examined its
foundations, and find that it has no support from either principle or
authority. But as the opinion is not .upon a question arising on the
record, or in the evidence, or otherwise judicially before the Court,
it is not binding as a precedent in this, or in 'any other tribunal.
It is entitled to no more consideration than the opinions of any.
private gentleman of. equal intelligence, learning and experience.
It may therefore be disregarded, without, in the slightest degree,
violating the principle of stare decisie. On the contrary, an adherence to it, in opposition to the decision in lNe.Dermond vs. Kennedy,
as I understand it, would be a violation of that principle. It is not
probable that the tribunals of other States have been misled by it;
but if this be the case, we can only regret that they have followed
a false light; they must bear in mind that the report of the case
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gave them full notice that the question thus disposed of was not
the matter in judgment in the case, and that every one familiar
with judicial action knows that an opinion on an abstract question
is never regarded by sound jurists as authority for everything.
But we are asked. to follow the decisions in other States on this
question. Those decisions, although entitled to respectful considertion, are not authority here. If they had been sanctioned by long
acquiesence of the people, after a thorough experience of the results to which they tend, they would deservedly have influnce on
our minds; but they are of recent origin, and were pronounced
under the influence of that courtesy which ever disposes the judiciary to sustain the action of the Legislature, unless in a clear case.
They may be presumed also to have been influenced by the conciousness of weakness, and inability to resist the antagonism of a
department which in some cases had a voice in the appointment of
judges, and in others possessed also the power of removal. It is not
unlikely also, that the great advantages of the public improvements
projected, created a pressure there, similar to that which now exists
here, and which, it is acknowledged, it is difficult to resist. But
this is no reason why judges elected by the people, and who can
resist every unjust coercion from any other department, by an appeal to the common sovereignty, should hesitate to give that protection to the citizens which the Constitution secures. The tendency of power to encroach upon the popular rights, is continual,
and it necessarily follows that those rights can only be maintained
by a perl)etual struggle. This is the reason why bad precedents
have but little weight in constitutional questions, when they violate
the rights of the people, or the principles of the government. It
Yas very propcrly said by Mr. Justice Bell, in Parkervs. Commonwealth, 6 Barr, 521, that "a different rule would expose the fundamental laws of the State to continual danger of subversion from encroachments which in the beginning did not attract public attention." A plain violation of the constitution, like a public nuisance, acquires no validity by its repetition or continuance.
In the continual vibrations, attendent upon the struggle between
pow(- and liberty, it is not strange that the powers of European
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cities should be influenced by the varying character of that struggle. Padua was at one time enslaved by her conquerors, at another
it rose to perfect independence, and then sank down into Austrian
despotism. London was at one time a rude military fortress, sur,Founded by woods and marsh-at another a splended Prefecture
of Rome, with its cqlumns, capitals, tesselated pavements, and
statues of heathen divinities-then a municipal corporation with
most extensive powers-then stripped by the hand of tyranny of
all its- corporate rights-then restored, with new and extensive privileges, accompanied with the extraordinary Parliamentary declaration that its charter was so far above the law that it can never here.
after be declared forfeited. - Hamburg was, at different times, subject to the Dukes of Saxony and the Counts of Holstein, at an.
other time it acquired the rights of sovereignty as a free and independent city. Bremen, Luheck, and other cities exercising the
powers of sovereignty, have passed through similar changes.. Evert
Rome herself, once the mistress of the world, and the mother of Nations, is now a "weeping iobe," under the-most absolute despotism. What light, therefore, can the powers and usages of the ancient or modern cities of the old world throw upon the pow&s of
municipal corporations here? .None whatever. The former were
the creatures of time and circumstance, with no definite or uniform
limit to their powers, sometimes absolute sovereigns-at other times
absolute slaves. 'The latter.are -the creatures of the law, established
for the purposes of local governnient alone, with powers specified
and limited in their charters. The usages,.of the first form no
precedent for -the action of the last. The references in the argument of counsel to the cities of Europe are therefore dismissed
without further remark.
It isoconceded that the Legislature may create cities,.borouihs,
counties and townships, with such territorial limits and such extent
of population, as they think proper to designate. They may erect
a borough or a township, composed of three rich men and two
poor men, or three poor men and two rich men, if they think proper. Putting the case in the most favorable light of a power exercised according to the wishes of a majority, is it enough to clothe
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the three rich men in the one case, and the three poor men in the
other, with power over the others, so far as relates to the local government of the borough or township? Can it be possible that under a constitution which professes to respect the rights of property,
the three rich men may be clothed with power to compel ihe poor
men to contract debts for distant rail-road projects, which may
sweep from them their humble dwellings, acquired by a life of industrial toil? Is it true that their widows and orphans, left with
nothing but a dwelling to shelter them, and the bare means of subsistance and education, can be thus involved in a debt without their
consent, which may in the end reduce them to homeless destitution ?
-Or is it true that three poor men who have, perhaps, nothing to
lose, have the power to involve the rich in liabilities. which may
strip them of their possessions and reduce them to beggary?
Immense bodies of uncultivated lands are owned by non-residents. Some of the owners are citizens of Pennsylvania-some
are citizens of other States-and others are inhabitants of foreign
countries-some are widows-others are minor children. All have
purchased their lands under solemn grants from the States, and
have paid taxes for the support of the Government for many years.
These owners are protected by the Constitution of. the United
States from every Act of Legislation which shall impair the obligation of their contracts, and they have a right to demand that
protection from the Judiciary of the Federal Government. It is
possible that the people who happen to live in the counties where
these lands are situated, may charge them with immense debts for
the construction of rail-roads? It is true that one man's land
may thus be taken to build a rail-road through land of another?
That one may be thus impoverished to enrich another?-ad that
deeds patent, and all the most solemn contracts, on which men
are accustomed to, repose in security, may be thus not only impaired, but absolutely nullified and trodden under foot? Is this to
be the practical construction of the great principle of liberty, taken
from "Magna Charta, and incorporated into our own constitution,
that "no :.;an can be deprived of his property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the laws of thb land? If this may be done,
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our property is held at tle will of others, and there is no such
thing as the right of property. If this be constitutional law, our
liberty is in the same jeopardy, for our citizens may be imprisoned
for the taxes assessed to pay the debts thus contracted without
their consent. But when two out of three County Commissioners,
without a vote of the people, are authorized to lay these enormous
burthens upon the persons and property of a whole county, who
shall measure the extent of the wrong? Why should the members
of municipal corporations, who are made such without their consent, be placed in a worse condition than those who voluntarily embark in private corporitions? If a man becomes a stockholder in
a bank, the Legislature have no power to convert the corporation
into a rail-road company, or even to authorize the diversion of, a
single -dollar of the capital to that object, without the uanimous
consent of the stockholders. A majority may controithe management of thd corporation, so long as they keep within the objects of
the original charter, but they cannot change its character or objects, even with the sanction of the Legislature. When the object
of the alteration of a charter is auxiliary to the original object,
and designed to enable the corporation to carry into executiofi the
very purpose of the original grant, with morefacility than could
otherwise he done, an individual corporator cannot complain:. but
when the alteration is a fundamental change in the original purpose, the .corporators are not bound by any such Act of the Legislature, although accepted by the- directors and a majority of- the
stockholders. Stovens vs. The Rutland and BurlingtonRail-road
Company. 1 Am. Law Reg. 154, Natusech vs. Irving at al, Gow
on Part. Appen. 576; Ware vs. The rand Junction Water Company, 2 Rus. &Mylne 461; Cunleff vs. The Manchesterand Bolton
Canal Company. 1 English Cond. Ch. Rep. 131 n.-Middle'sex
Turnpike Co., vs. Lock, 8 Mass. 268; Same vs. Swan, 10 Mass.
384; Same vs. Walter, 10 Mass. 390, Hartford and New Haven
R. R. Ceo., vs. Croswell, 5 Hill, 385; -Ellis vs. Marshall, 2 Mass.
269; Gray vs. Monongahela Nav. Co., 2 W. & S, 150; Indiana
and Bbensburg Turnpike Co., vs. Phillips,2 Penn. R. 184; Hunt
vs. The Shrewesb.ury, &c., Railway Co. 3Eng. Rep. LawandEqui-
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ty, 144; Livingston vs. Lynch, et al, 4 John. Rep. 573. And the
ieason of this is, that members ofprivate corporations, like other
citizens of the Commonwealth, have a right of property which even
corporate majorities cannot violate. No good reason has been assigned why the members of municipal corporations, the people
themselves, should not possess the same rights. It may be appropriate, in the discussion of political questions, to talk about
submission to the will -of the majority. But where property is
concerned, it is to be disposed of according to the will of the owner.
In despotic governments, where the people have no rights of
liberty or property, and where all power is concentrated in the
sovereign, every question is necessarily a political one, to be disposed of according to the discretion of the government. But we
owe a lasting debt of gratitude to the valor and wisdom of our ancestors for liberating us from this bondage, and expressly "reserving the rights of liberty and property, out of general powers of
government." Under our free constitution, questions of property
are therefore not political ones, but mere questions of meum and
tuum to be decided, upon a fair trial, in due course of law. Municipal corporations cannot destroy or affect the rights of property.
They are mere creatures of the government, instituted for governmental purposes alone. They may be established without the consent of the inhabitants within their limits, and may be abolished at
the pleasure of the power that created them. They have no permanent existence for a single day. They are therefore incapable
of any act, except the necessary duties of local government, and
apart from that duty, cannot enter into any contract which shall
perpetuate their existence, or bind the persons or property of the
inhabitants or others. Nor can they be clothed by the Legislature
with any such power, for want of the essential element in every
contract, the consent of all tie parties to be bound.
But it is said that the Legislature are the judges of what acts
fall within the range of municipal duties and powers, and that their
judgment is conclusive on the question-that no matter how great
may be the abuse of authority in this respect, it is an injury for
which the judicial power can furnish no redress. This argument

108

SHARPLESS vs. THE MAYOR, &a., OF PHILADELPHIA.

proves too much; for, if true, it abolishes the distribution of power and destroys the very check created for the preservation of the
liberty and rights of the citizen; and, instead of putting his constitutional rights under the protection of "'the judgment of his
peers" and "the law of the land," it places them entirely under
the discretion of the -Legislature. If they may destroy the rights
of property, whenever they think proper to decide that municipal
interests and duties require their destruction, they may deprive the
citizen of his life, or his liberty under the same exercise of discretion. Upon the same principle they may decide that- all his houses, lands and goods, shall be sold and the proceeds disposed of according to the will of the majority, ana that the minority themselves shall be reduced to bondage as the slaves of the majority.
Such a construction would clothe the Legislature with the most absolute and unlimited power, and would be utterly destructive of
all constitutional rights. To say that no remedy exists in -the judiciary for such a plain violation of the constitution, is to abrogate that provision which declares that "all Courts shall be
open, and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,'
person, or reputation,' shall have remedy by due course of law" and
right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." That this provision applies as well to injuries sttempted by
any departnient of the government, as to those perpetrated by individuals, -is appa'rent from its connexion with clauses -expressly
provided to protect the people froni any invasion of their rights by
the former. That. this was the object ofrit, is alone manifest from
its insertion in the very section which provides that the citizen may
bring suits even against the Commonwealth herself.
It is true that where the unconstitutionality of an act consists in
the concealed motives fo-its enactment-for those motives are'so
intermingled with legitimate ones, that they cannot be distinguished and separated, the judicial power may not extend to the case. It
is then a question of fraud which it would not be proper for one department of the government to impute to another, and in which
one cannot, in a collateral proceeding, have jurisdiction over the
other. The taxing power, when exercised according to all the
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forms of constitutional authority, may, it is true, be tainted with
an intention to appropriate the funds to private uses, or to other
improper and unauthorized uses. Against this abuse the remedy is
with the people, and may be beyond the reach of judicial action.
But where the uncolistitutional object is distinctly apparent on the
face of the law-where the purpose, as in this case, is admitted to
be one which does not fall within the legitimate limits of municipal
powers-where the invasion of constitutional rights has not been
concealed, or placed out of reach by the confusion of intermingled
legislative motives-and where as in this case, we see it in its nakedness, long before it envelopes itself in the cloak of the taxing power, there is no difficulty whatever in arresting the evil at the
threshhold.
The Legislature have undoubtedly an enlarged discretion. It is
no part of our duty, or inclination, to impugn the motives of members, or treat their acts with disrespect. It can never be their intention, as a body, to disregard the rights of their constituents.
But in the pressure of their varied and burthensome duties, it is
not always possible for them to perceive the bearing which their
enactments may have upon individual rights. For this reason the
sovereignty was not entrusted exclusively to them, or to any single department of government.-For this reason, the judicial power was created; and it is the duty of that power to act faithfully
according to the purposes of its existence: and when "right and
justice" shall require it, to declare that the constitution is supreme,
and that to render an enactment valid, both the end and the means
must be such as do not violate individual rights-that there is no
power in the Commonwealth which has discretionary power to take
away the property of the citizen without "just compensation"without the "judgment of his peers," and contrary to "the law of
the land," that this cannot be done even to accomplish a constitutional object, much less where, as in the case before us, the end and
the means are alike unauthorized. It has been truthfully and beautifully said by the chief executive officer of the Union, that every
citizen of this country'is "one of a nation of independent sovereigns"-that he cannot wander abroad so far as to go beyond the
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protection of his country's constitution. The flag that represents
the power and the rights of the people is his sure guaranty
against injury from all the other nations of the earth. Why
shall it not secure him the like protection from his own? It will
avail but little to protect him in his rights abroad, if his substance
may be exposed to the jaws-of devouring tyranny at home. Justice is not to "be entangled in nets of form. It is immaterial in
what garb unconttitutional oppression may approach the citizen,
whether in the purple or fine linen of associated wealth, in private
corporations, in the more attractive costume of municipal majorities, or even in.the honored robes of legislative power. It is the
duty of the judiciary to administer justice so as to protect the citizen from every form of unconstitutional attack.
The opinion here given is, of course, confined to *the case before
us, in which'those who Dsk our intervention opposed the proposed
usurpation upon their rights as soon as it came to their knowledge.
As the Legislature and the Municipal authorities are the agents of
the people, for some purposes, and are professedly acting for their
benefit, it may be a question hereafter how far the latter can stand
by and receive the benefits of such subscription or allow third persons to be deceived into investments, in the belief that the acts are
approved of, without being precluded from afterwardls objecting.
In dealings'between man and man, where an agent transcends his
authority- and the principal omits, to dissent as soon as the act
comes to his knowledge, he is, in general, bound by it. Under
the law of nationsi where there is an abuse of power, if the nation is silent and obeys,. the people are considered as approving of
the conduct of their rulers. Vatte], 18, 11. It is upon this principle that treaties and. contracts of usurpers, made in behalf of the
nation, by its rulers de facto, are binding upon the nation.* The
present case is entirely free from the application of this rule.
When other cases shall arise to' which it may properly apply, justice, will be done according to law. I would be the last to sanction repudiation of debts contracted in good faith. But the true
way for Municipal Corporations to avoid this calamity is to contract
no debts excep t such as are clearly within their corporate powers.
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If the contrary be attempted, the power of the law cannot be more
appropriately exercised than in applying its preventive process.
The magnitude of the interests involved, and the great power and.
influence of the parties to be enjoined, furnish no reason for disregarding the supremacy of the LAW, for "her seat is the bosom of
God: her voice is the harmony of the world; all things in Heaven
and Earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care; and
the greatest as not exenipt from her power."
In conclusion, I am in favor of granting the injunction because:1st. The proposed subscription puts the property of the citizen
under the control of a private corporation without his consent, thus
depriving him of the right of "possessing and protecting it," and
therefore violates the 1st section of the bill of rights.
2d. It converts the members of a municipal government into a corporation which has nothing governmental in its objects, and which"
being bound by contract, cannot be "altered, reformed or abolished," at the pleasure of the people; and it is therefore a violation
of the 2d section.
3d. It puts the property of the citizen, without his consent, under
a government where it can no longer be protected by "free and
equal" votes, but where wealth controls poverty, and where money
has more -Votes than men; and therefore violates the 5th section.
4th. It deprives the citizen of his property without the "judgment of his peers," and without a trial in "due course of law ;"
and therefore violates the 9th section.
5th. It takes the property of the citizen without just compensation, and is therefore a usurpation of powers not granted, as well
as a violation of rights plainly expressed and implied in the 10th
section.
6th. It deprives the citizen of the lands and goods secured to him
by patents, deeds, and other contracts, and therefore violates the
17th section.
Tth. It invests a corporate body with the privilege of taking private property without requiring such corporation to make just compensation in advance, or to give adequate security therefore; and
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therefore violates the 4th section of the 7th article of the amended
constitution.
8th. The appointment by the Legislature of the municipal officers as the agents of the present plaintiffs to charge their lands
.and goods with these burthens, without their actual consent, gives
such officers no more authority that a similar enactment would confer upon Queen Victoria or the Emperor Nicholas. It is assuming
the garb without the reality of assent, and is therefore an injury
about to be perpetrated under circumstances of peculiar aggravation. To deny a "remedy by due course of law" and to refuse to
administer "right and justice without delay" in such a case, would
be a violation of the 11th section of the declaration of rights.
My views on the subject may be unfashionable. But when credit
shall be exhausted, and the day of payment shall come; -when the
bonds, (which are to be issued like other obligations of mere sureties without making any provision for payment,) shall come to maturity-when the rail-road excitement shall subside and reason stall
resume her dominion-when the exhileration of profuse expenditure
shall give place to the gloom.to be produced by the grindingoexactions of the tax gatherer, when the rich shall be impoverished, and
the poor shall be cast into prison'-when all classes shall be involved in millions of debt beyond the means of payment-when individual industry and enterprise shall cease with the destruction of
individual rights-when the freemen of this Commonwealth shall
become the bondmen of corporations, I shall, if surviving, have the
melancholy consolation of knowing that I have endeavored, to the
extent of my feeble abilities, to avert these calamities from my fellow citizens, and to maintain their rights of property according tomy understanding of"the constitution.
As I think that the injunction ought to be granted, for the reasons already assigned, it is unnecessary and improper, on this preliminary motion, to consider the other points urged in the support
of the application.

